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IAM v. OPEC: "Acts of States" and
"Passive Virtues"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in InternationalAssociation
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. The Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) I has rekindled the argu-
ment concerning the legitimacy of a court's use of its "passive vir-
tu%" 2 powers. In IAM, the court held that the "passive" act of state
doctrine, admittedly a judge-made rule of law, supplanted a federal
statute3 which seemingly provided controlling principles for the de-
cision. 4 Critics of this decision argue that the court should have
reached an opposite conclusion on this issue, i.e., that the statute
should have controlled the act of state doctrine. In so arguing, crit-
ics find themselves restating the arguments initially presented by
commentators such as Herbert Wechsler and Gerald Gunther
against analogous uses of the passive virtues powers. This note will
first examine the case, then present, and ultimately answer, the criti-
cism it has spawned. In doing so, the note will reflect on the contin-
uing controversy over the courts use of the passive virtues powers.
In IAM, the court was asked to determine whether a foreign
government-controlled commodity cartel violated United States an-
titrust laws. The plaintiff, a labor union, sued OPEC for treble dam-
ages5 and injunctive reliefb under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
7
The plaintiff contended that OPEC violated these acts through its
1. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
2. The term "passive virtues" has been used to describe various techniques used by the
courts to avoid "on-the-meits" adjudication of certain types of "cases confessedly within
[their] jurisdiction." See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1935)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). The term was apparently coined by Alexander Bickel. Bickel,
The Supreme Court, 1960-Forward" The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For
the most part, the term has been used to describe the various devices used by the United
States Supreme Court (standing, ripeness, political question and act of state doctrines) in
refusing appellate adjudication of certain controversial issues of constitutional law. Id at
42-51. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 656-62 (2d ed. 1973).
3. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
4. 1AM, 649 F.2d at 1359.
5. The plaintiff claimed treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
Section 15 provides, in part, that "[any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
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admitted price-fixing activities. The plaintiff asserted that United
States antitrust laws applied to OPEC's price-fixing because those
activities "substantially effected" United States commerce. 8 The
fact that they were undertaken by foreign governments on foreign
soil was, for the purposes of the acts, entirely irrelevant.
The district court, uncomfortable with the implications of the
suit, found jurisdiction9 lacking and dismissed under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b). l° The Ninth Circuit (per Judge Choy"),
sharing the district court's inhibitions, 2 affirmed, although on en-
tirely different grounds. Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit
did not rely on the doctrine of sovereign immunity in avoiding the
suit. Instead, it premised its decision on the act of the state doctrine.
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court. . . and shall recover threefold damages by him sustained ...."
6. Injunctive relief was claimed under 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1973 & Supp. 1982). Section 26
provides, in part, that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws ...."
7. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973); the Clayton Anti-Trust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1973).
8. The extent of the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach is deemed dependent on a
tripartite analysis:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce
of the United States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act? As a matter of international comity and fairness,
should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?
See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir.
1976).
9. Subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) and personal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
10. International Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (LAM) v. The Org. of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The district
court found the threshold question to be whether OPEC's price-fixing activities could be
described as "commercial," thereby excepting OPEC's members from sovereign immunity.
Id at 567. This "commercial exception" to sovereign immunity is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1973 & Supp. 1982). Section 1605(a)(2) provides that foreign states shall not
be immune in cases
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.
11. Judge Choy is also responsible for the highly regarded opinion in Timberlane.
12. 14M, 649 F.2d at 1358 ("The district court was understandably troubled by the
broader implications of an antitrust action against the OPEC nations").
LAfM v. OPEC
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine precludes American courts from adju-
dicating the legality of "sovereign" acts undertaken by foreign states
on their own territory.' 3 The doctrine is grounded on the principles
of international comity and the domestic separation of powers. The
doctrine's comity considerations are evident in the following state-
ment taken from a 1918 decision applying the doctrine: "To permit
the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly
imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the
peace of nations."' The doctrine's separation of powers underpin-
nings can be identified in the following quote from the 1AM
decision:
The doctrine recognizes the institutional limitations of the courts
and the peculiar requirements of successful foreign relations. To
participate adeptly in the global community, the United States
must speak with one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate
foreign policy. The political branches of our government are
able to consider the competing economic and political considera-
tions and respond to the public will in order to carry on foreign
relations in accordance with the best interests of the country as a
whole. The courts, in contrast, focus on single disputes and make
decisions on the basis of legal principles.
15
In practice, the doctrine acts as a "special rule modifying the
ordinary rules of conffict of laws."' 6 To illustrate: assume a foreign
government issues a decree nationalizing the assets of an American
corporation located in its territory. Assume further that this expro-
priation was accomplished without compensation, and the corpora-
tion felt compelled to seek redress in an American court. ' 7 If the act
13. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). It is claimed that
the doctrine's roots extend back to the 1674 English decision in Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng.
Rep. 992. See Note, The Origin and Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 595 (1977). One of the earliest, and probably the most influential, American decision
applying the doctrine is Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory").
14. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
15. 649 F.2d at 1358.
16. Henkin, Act of State Today. Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 175, 178 (1967).
17. For the purposes of this illustration, one must also, of course, assume the non-
existence of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L.
1982]
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of state doctrine was not available to the court in these circum-
stances, it would be forced to decide the case on ordinary "conflicts"
principles: "It would first decide what law. 'governed' the issues. If
under accepted choice of law principles the foreign law should gov-
ern, the court could still refuse to apply that law if it were found to
be contrary to the public policy of the forum."' 8 Under ordinary
conflicts principles, then, the court would eventually be required to
determine either: 1) that the decree nationalizing the property of a
United States corporation without compensation was violative of
United States public policy (which, in turn, would call for the appli-
cation of United States law); or 2) that the foreign government acted
within its own laws in nationalizing the property. In either situa-
tion, the court would be sitting in judgment on the sovereign acts of
a foreign government.
In the interests of comity and the separation of powers, the act
of state doctrine modifies this "ordinary" rule of conflicts law. The
doctrine dictates "that the foreign 'law' (i.e. the act of state) must
govern certain transactions and that no public policy of the forum
may stand in the way."19 Further, the courts should "not examine
the acts of a foreign sovereign within its own borders, in order to
determine whether or not those acts were legal under the municipal
law of the foreign state." 20 Inserted into the above hypothetical, the
act of state doctrine would then dictate that the law of the expropri-
ating country control, and that the court not examine the legitimacy
of that expropriation under the local law. In effect, the court would
No. 88-633, § 301, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013, as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970) (hereinafter
cited as "the Hickenlooper Amendment"). The Hickenlooper Amendment provides, in part,
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign
state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in viola-
tion of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation
and the other standards set out in this subsection ....
18. Henkin, supra note 16, at 178 (footnote omitted). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
19. Henkin, supra note 16. But see Comment, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation
to Private and Public International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1293 (1962) ("[fjoreign
decrees intended to confiscate property owned by nationals of the acting state, but situated
within the jurisdiction of the forum at the time of the enactment, are uniformly denied
extraterritorial effect if found to be inconsistent with the public policy of the forum") (foot-
note omitted).
20. Banco de Espafna v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1940).
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be forced to deny relief to the corporation, and dismiss the suit.21
The "leading modem statement" 22 of the act of state doctrine
appears in the Supreme Court's 1963 decision, Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino.23 The Sabbalino case (whose facts served as a
basis for the above illustration) arose in the context of a mini-"cold
war" between the United States and Cuba following Cuba's 1959
revolution. In February and July of 1960, the defendant (Farr,
Witlock & Co., an American commodity broker) contracted to
purchase sugar from a Cuban subsidiary of an American-controlled
Cuban corporation (C.A.V.). In August, as the sugar was being
readied for shipping, C.A.V. was nationalized. 24 In order to remove
the sugar from the country, Farr, Witlock was forced to contract
with the Cuban government through its external commerce bank.
Payment for the sugar on this new contract was to be made later in
New York.
Before payment became due, however, Farr, Witlock and
C.A.V. entered into another agreement. Under this agreement,
Farr, Witlock was to refuse to pay the Cubans under the post-na-
tionalization contract. In consideration for this, Farr, Witlock was
21. Dismissal would be warranted because "where the controlling issue is the legality
of a sovereign act and where the only remedy sought is barred by act of state considerations
dismissal is appropriate." 649 F.2d at 1361. Some commentators feel that courts assume
"the validity of foreign acts of state" when they dismiss on the basis of the doctrine. This
issue is discussed in Golbert & Bradford, The Act of State Doctrine.- Dunhill and other
Sabbatino Progeny, 9 Sw. L. Rv. 1, 22 (1977).
22. Timberlane 549 F.2d at 605.
23. 376 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. This nationalization came in retaliation to the United States' reduction of the sugar
quota for Cuba (which itself came in retaliation to an earlier Cuban nationalization of the
American controlled oil industry). The quota system was adopted in 1934, and, according to
noted historian Hubert Herring, worked as follows: "Under this system the American Secre-
tary of Agriculture sets the total requirement of sugar in the United States. After allowing
for domestic production, the balance is allocated to the various sugar-producing countries,
their quotas fixed by acts of Congress at irregular intervals amid a feverish spate of lobby-
ing." H. HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 414 n.5 (1972). In the years 1934-1960,
the Cubans were allocated approximately one-third of the United States' import require-
ments. Not only was this a substantial market for that sugar-dependent country, but an
extremely lucrative one as well. The United States paid artificially high prices for the com-
modity. In fact, these inflated prices benefited the Cubans $150 million annually beyond the
world market price. Id
The loss of the quota would have been a spectacular blow to the Cubans, had not the
Soviet Union stepped in and bought Cuba's surplus sugar. Indeed, in a 1965 interview Fidel
Castro confessed: "The Cuban economy. would have received a very hard blow. Maybe it
would not have finished off the Revolution, but it would have forced us to live under almost
primitive conditions for a long time." L. LOCKWOOD, CASTRO'S CUBA, CUBA'S FIDEL 213
(1969).
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to be: 1) defended by C.A.V. in a suit by the Cubans; 2) indemni-
fied against any possible adverse judgments; and 3) paid 10% of
C.A.V.'s possible recovery in a suit.25 Later, Farr, Witlock denied
payment, and the external commerce bank brought suit for
conversion.
The district court denied the bank's claim, finding the national-
ization of C.A.V. violated international law.26 While this finding
was initially affirmed upon appeal, 27 the Supreme Court reversed on
the basis of the act of state doctrine. The Court held that the act of
state doctrine compelled United States courts not to "examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the
time of suit...,,.28 Accordingly, the legality of the Cuban national-
ization and the contract which flowed from it were non-justiciable
issues. Hence, the contract stood, and the bank, not C.A.V., was
awarded the proceeds of the sugar sale.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court identified the strong
comity and separation of powers interests behind the doctrine:
Such decisions [concerning the sovereign acts of a foreign gov-
ernment within its own territory, made in the absence of the act
of state doctrine] would, if the acts involved were declared inva-
lid, often be likely to give offense to the country; since the con-
cept of territorial sovereignty is so deep seated, any state may
resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign to accord
validity to acts within its territorial borders. Piecemeal disposi-
tions of this sort involving the probability of affront to another
state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on
by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render less
favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be
reached. Relations with third countries which have engaged in
similar [expropriations] would not be immune from effect. 29
The Court also identified the constitutional basis for the doctrine:
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doc-
trine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the ca-
pacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.
25. The above facts were taken from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166,
169-71 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 379-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
27. 307 F.2d 845, 859-68 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. 376 U.S. at 428.
29. Id. at 431-32.
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The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitu-
tional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships be-
tween branches of government in a system of separation of
powers . . . It]he doctrine . . . expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further
this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the commu-
nity of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
30
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN _AM
Applying the above-mentioned principles, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision in IAM. Determining that the
OPEC countries' price-fixing activities were "sovereign acts"3' un-
dertaken by foreign governments within their own territory, the
court held that the doctrine precluded it from judging the legality of
those acts under United States law.32 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed dismissal, for "in a case such as this where the controlling
issue is the legality of a sovereign act and where the only remedy
sought is barred by act of state considerations dismissal is
appropriate."
33
As in Sabbatino, the court considered issues of international
comity and the domestic separation of powers in reaching its deci-
sion. Regarding comity, the court noted:
The remedy IAM seeks is an injunction against the OPEC
nations. The possibility of insult to the OPEC states ... is ap-
parent from the very nature of this action and the remedy sought
. .. . [The granting of any relief would in effect amount to an
order from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to
alter its chosen means of allocating and profiting from its own
valuable natural resources.
34
30. Id at 423.
31. The doctrine precludes American courts from determining the legality of "sover-
eign" acts of a foreign state. Purely "commercial" acts by states, for example, are not enti-
tled to the same deference. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 698 (1976). According to the court in lAM, the OPEC nations' price-fixing activi-
ties, while having commercial elements, were not purely commercial acts: "The importance
of the alleged price-fixing activity to the OPEC nations cannot be ignored. Oil revenues
represent their only significant source of income. Consideration of their sovereignty cannot
be separated from their near total dependence upon oil." 649 F.2d at 1358.
32. Id at 1361.
33. Id
34. Id
19821
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In terms of the separation of powers, the court worried that "should
the court hold that OPEC's actions are legal, this 'would greatly
strengthen the bargaining hand' of the OPEC nations in the event
that Congress or the Executive chooses to condemn OPEC's ac-
tions."35 The court held that these two considerations supervened
any possible benefits which might flow from a different decision in
the case.
IV. A "CLASSICAL" CRITICISM
At first glance, it would seem that LAM was ripe for the appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine. As the court correctly noted, a
decision against OPEC in the suit would have, at the very least, in-
sulted the nations of OPEC. Memories of colonialism and foreign
economic domination have hyper-sensitized the OPEC nations (and
the Third World as a whole) on the issue of sovereignty. Any im-
pingement or slur on this sovereignty, especially by a country often
accused of economic imperialism, would have been deeply resented.
What better case, then, to be governed by a doctrine grounded on
international comity?
Commentator Gerald Goldman, however, vehemently protests
the invocation of the act of state doctrine in this case. 36 Goldman's
criticism focuses on the fact that the doctrine is "judge-made;" it is
neither constitutionally nor statutorily compelled. As such, he con-
tends, it must yield in the presence of a federal statute which pro-
vides controlling principles for a case: "Although, to quote the
Supreme Court, the doctrine has 'constitutional underpinnings,' it is
not 'compelled by . . . the Constitution.' It therefore cannot stand
in the way of enforcement of an applicable federal statute." 37 But,
insists Goldman, in LAM the doctrine was used to supplant applica-
ble federal statutes (the antitrust laws).38 Surely the court erred in
elevating the doctrine to such a status.
Goldman's position, that a court may not refuse to apply a fed-
eral statute which is neither unconstitutional nor inapplicable to the
35. Id
36. Goldman, Circuit Erred in Choice ofLegal Rationalesfor "OPEC" Legal Times of
Washington, September 7, 1981, at 13.
37. Id (footnotes omitted).
38. By calling the antitrust laws "applicable," Goldman is not contending that they
necessarily extended to regulate the activity complained of in this case. Indeed, considering
the tripartite analysis declared in Timberlane, it is fairly certain that the laws would not
reach OPEC. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
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situation before it, is not a novel one. Indeed, professor Alexander
Bickel has deemed this position "classical":
If a case is offered by a conventional plaintiff who has standing in
the pure sense, this [classical] position maintains, the question
whether or not the Court must hear it is answered by the federal
law of remedies; that is, by jurisdictional statutes plus standard
rules of the law of equity, themselves subject to statutory change.
There is no judicial discretion to decline adjudication, no such
attenuation of the duty.39
Goldman's argument seems sound. Generally speaking, when
a judge-made rule of law directly conflicts with a constitutional fed-
eral statute, that judge-made rule will fall. But, as Goldman fails to
note, this general rule is not without exceptions. Note, for example,
the exception recently defined by the Supreme Court in Doe v. Dela-
ware.40 The Doe case involved a custody fight between the Dela-
ware Department of Health and Social Services and the natural
parents of five children over the custody of those children. The De-
partment declared the parents (a half-brother and sister) unfit, and
took the children from them. Later, the Department determined
that the children should be put up for adoption, and consequently
filed suit (pursuant to a Delaware statutory scheme) to terminate the
parent's "parental rights."
In an attempt to maintain those rights, the parents challenged
the constitutionality of the statutory termination proceedings.
These challenges were properly raised, and consequently were spe-
cifically addressed by both the Delaware Superior and Supreme
Courts.41 Both courts rejected the challenges, and judged the termi-
nation of parental rights under the statute valid.42 Accordingly, the
parents appealed to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to
39. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 122 (1962). This position is apparently designed as "classical" because it de-
rives from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
404 (1821). In Cohens, the Court held that:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the consti-
tution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever difficulties, a
case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us (emphasis
added).
40. In re Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed sub nom,
Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382 (1981) (per curiam).
41. 450 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id at 384.
1982]
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Section 1257(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code, which pro-
vides, in part, that:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision may be had may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court as follows . . . By appeal, where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
Despite the fact that the federal issues presented in the case were
both clear4 3 and raised in conformance with Delaware's procedural
requirements, the Court dismissed the appeal "for want of a prop-
erly presented federal question." 44 The Court chose to ignore the
mandate of section 1257 in favor of a judicially-created abstention
policy. Justice Brennan, writing in a "classical" mode, dissented:
The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is not discretionary ....
Having raised a federal constitutional challenge to the [Delaware
"termination" proceedings] under which their parental rights
were terminated, and having received a final judgment from the
highest court of the State upholding the statute and affirming the
termination order, appellants have a right to appellate review. I
can discern no basis for dismissing this appeal for want of a prop-
erly presented federal question. .... 45
If a judicial abstention policy could supervene application of
section 1257 in Doe, it seems that a similar policy (the act of state
doctrine) could justify the action taken by the court in AM.
Goldman, however, might argue that the decision in Doe is in-
apposite. The supervened statute in Doe concerned jurisdiction.
46
It was not one where "controlling principles" were provided.
Goldman insists that "the act of state doctrine has never before been
held to permit the judiciary to refuse to enforce a relevant rule of
43. This was not a case where it was contended that the "inadequacy of the record...
prevent[ed] the constitutional issue ... being considered 'in clean cut and concrete form.'"
See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197
Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (citing Rescue Army v. Munic-
ipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)).
44. 450 U.S. at 382.
45. Id at 392. (footnote omitted) (italics in original).
46. As the court noted in IAM, "[t]he act of state doctrine is not jurisdictional...
Rather, it is a prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in sensitive areas." 649
F.2d at 1359 (citation omitted). Indeed, most of the statutes which have not been followed
by the courts have been jurisdictional. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wynadotte Chemicals Corp., 401
U.S. 493, 499 (1971) (where the Court refused to accept originad jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)(3) (1973)).
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decision that Congress has directed be applied to the circumstances
before the court."47
This assertion, however, is quite incorrect. There is ample pre-
cedent for the JAM court's conclusion that the act of state doctrine
can serve to supplant an applicable federal statute which supplies
controlling principles for a decision. In fact, there is authority for
the specific proposition that the doctrine can serve to supervene ap-
plication of the antitrust statutes. The doctrine was used in this
manner in the Supreme Court's 1909 decision in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. 48
The Ninth Circuit itself has held, in Occidental Petroleum Corp.
v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. ,49 that the act of state doctrine can act to
supervene application of the antitrust statutes. The Occidental case
involved a fight between two oil companies over offshore rights in
the Persian Gulf. One, Occidental, discovered oil on territory
granted to it by one Persian shiekdom. Upon this discovery, Occi-
dental claimed, the other oil company (Buttes) incited two Gulf
countries (Iran and Sharjah) to claim sovereignty over the area of
the strike. This, according to Occidental, led to a cessation of drill-
ing, and a loss of substantial profits.50 Accordingly, Occidental
brought an unfair competition suit against Buttes under the antitrust
statutes.
The court held that act of state considerations barred a determi-
nation of whether Buttes had conspired in violation of the statutes.
According to the court:
[Tbo establish their claim as pleaded plaintiffs must prove, inter
alia, that Sharjah issued a fraudulent territorial waters decree,
and that Iran laid claim to the [territory of the strike] at the be-
hest of the defendants .... [S]uch inquiries by this court into
the authenticity and motivation of the acts of foreign sovereigns
would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and complica-
tion that the act of state doctrine aims to avert.5'
Hence, despite the antitrust statutes "controlling principles," the
47. Goldman, supra note 36, at 13.
48. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
49. 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
50. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 98-101 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
51. Id at 110 (footnote omitted).
1982]
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court applied the act of state doctrine and dismissed the Suit.52
Considering the conclusion of the courts in Doe and Occiden-
tal, it seems that the AM court acted within its power in dismissing
the suit on the basis of the act of state doctrine. Goldman's argu-
ment, based on "classical" notions of the role of the courts in our
system of government, fails to take account of changed realities.
The reality is that the courts will abstain from adjudicating under
certain federal statutes in a number of situations. It is this reality
that the court recognized in AM.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PASSIVE VIRTUES
Gerald Goldman's criticism of the decision in IAM reflects the
continuing controversy over the court's use of its "passive virtues."
While it seems that the courts' discretionary power to refuse adjudi-
cation under certain federal statutes is now well established, the ar-
guments asserting the non-existence of such a power continue.
Professor Herbert Wechsler has declared a specific exercise of the
"passive virtues" power "wholly without basis in the law." 53 Profes-
sor Gerald Gunther declares the power to be a "law-debasing" prin-
ciple of judicial expediency. 54 He feels that this principle will have
serious ramifications: "Expediency as to avoidance devices is conta-
gious; the effort to shield the integrity of adjudication on the merits
from infection fails.""
Despite these criticisms, courts continue to act "passively" and
refuse adjudication under certain federal statutes. Perhaps, as one
commentator declares, there has been no "satisfactory" explanation
as to the basis of the "passive virtues" powers.56 The lack of a
clearly defined basis has certainly contributed to the numerous at-
tacks on the exercise of the power. Still, as evidenced by the deci-
sion in Doe, the courts continue to avail themselves of this "passive"
52. Id at 113.
53. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 47 (1961). Accord, Doe, 450 U.S. at 387 n.l I (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
54. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive 'irtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1964).
55. Id at 14.
56. Note, The Discretionary Power of the Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from State
Courts, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 688, 706 (1963). Accord Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135, 1178-79 (1970) (con-
cluding that no satisfactory rationale exists for refusal to adjudicate under the "passive"
political questions doctrine).
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power. Considering this precedent, the decision in JAM seems en-
tirely justified.
Michael Robert Tyler

